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Abstract
A recent discovery of a new class of microarchitectural
attacks called Spectre picked up the attention of the se-
curity community as these attacks can circumvent many
traditional mechanisms of defense. One of the attacks—
Bounds Check Bypass—can neither be efficiently solved
on system nor architectural levels and requires changes
in the application itself. So far, the proposed mitigations
involved serialization, which reduces the usage of CPU
resources and causes high overheads. In this report, we
explore methods of delaying the vulnerable instructions
without complete serialization. We discuss several ways
of achieving it and compare them with Speculative Load
Hardening, an existing solution based on a similar idea.
The solutions of this type cause 60% overhead across
Phoenix benchmark suite, which compares favorably to
the full serialization causing 440% slowdown.
1 Introduction
In 2017, multiple research groups independently discov-
ered a new class of microarchitectural attacks, later called
Spectre [4]. These attacks target speculative execution, a
feature of modern processors that improves CPU utiliza-
tion by executing certain code paths speculatively, before
CPU knows, which of the paths is correct. For example, if
an application has a conditional jump, the CPU could start
executing one of the branches before it knows the value
of the condition. It may later find out that the prediction
was wrong, at which point it will discard the computed
results. However, the CPU will not discard the changes
in the microarchitectural state, including the cached data.
The Spectre attacks take advantage of this property to
circumvent the existing protection mechanisms and leak
secret data.
The original Spectre paper [4] described two attacks:
Bounds Check Bypass (BCB) and Branch Target Injec-
tion (BTI). While the later attack has been patched by
1 i = input[0];
2 if (i < size) {
3 secret = foo[i];
4
5 baz = bar[secret]; }
(a) Example in C
a1 = f0(input)
if (condition)
secret = read(a1)
a2 = f2(secret)
read_or_write(a2)
(b) Generalized code pattern
Figure 1: Code snippets vulnerable to Bounds Check
Bypass.
a microcode update, the former stays unfixed. BCB is
viewed as an application vulnerability and Intel explicitly
states that its mitigation is a responsibility of software
developers [2].
To mitigate Bounds Check Bypass, Intel official guide-
lines [2] suggest using the LFENCE instruction as an ex-
plicit serialization point. The application developer has
to identify vulnerable parts of the application and man-
ually harden them with LFENCEs to prevent speculation.
However, as demonstrated by the long history of memory
errors, vulnerabilities can stay unnoticed (and unpatched)
for a long time.
To eliminate possibilities for an attack, we have to
protect the entire application. A naive way of doing so
would be to add LFENCEs after every conditional branch.
Although being effective from the security standpoint, this
approach significantly reduces the CPU utilization and
causes high overheads. Our experiments show a runtime
overhead of up to 440% on Phoenix benchmarks [5].
In this report, we discuss and evaluate approaches to
preventing speculation on a more fine-grained level: using
data dependencies.
2 Bounds Check Bypass
In essence, Bounds Check Bypass is a buffer over- or
under-read that succeeds even in the presence of tradi-
tional protection measures.
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1 i = input[0];
2
3
4 if (i < 42) {
5
6
7
8 address = i ∗ 8;
9 secret = ∗address;
10
11
12 baz = 100;
13 baz += ∗secret;}
(a) Vulnerable code
i = input[0];
if (i < 42) {
LFENCE;
address = i ∗ 8;
secret = ∗address;
baz = 100;
baz += ∗secret;}
(b) LFENCE-based
serialization
i = input[0];
PUSH rax;
if (i < 42) {
LAHF;
XOR rax, r15;
POP rax;
address = i ∗ 8;
secret = ∗address;
XOR r15, secret;
XOR r15, secret;
baz = 100;
baz += ∗secret;}
(c) LAHF-based
data dependency
i = input[0];
all_ones = 0xFFFF...;
mask = all_ones;
if (i < 42) {
CMOVGE 0, mask;
address = i ∗ 8;
secret = ∗address;
secret &= mask;
baz = 100;
baz += ∗secret;}
(d) Speculative
load hardening
i = input[0];
XOR i, r15;
if (i < 42) {
address = i ∗ 8;
secret = ∗address;
XOR r15, secret;
XOR r15, secret;
baz = 100;
baz += ∗secret;}
(e) Dependency on argu-
ments
Figure 2: Approaches to preventing Bounds Check Bypass. Listings (c) and (e) assume that R15 is exclusively reserved
for creating data dependencies.
Consider the code snippet in Figure 1a: Without the
bounds check on line 2, an adversary with control over
the input can force the load on line 3 to read from any
address, including those beyond the array foo. Tradi-
tionally, vulnerabilities of this type were mitigated with
bounds checks (such as the one on line 2) that permit the
access only if the address is within the object bounds.
However, there is an issue with this approach. The
underlying assumption of bounds checking is that the
instructions run in order, which is not the case in modern
pipelined CPUs with branch prediction. Such a CPU can
run the check in parallel with the vulnerable load if it
predicts that the check is not likely to fail. Later, it will
find out that the prediction was wrong and discard the
speculated load, but, as Spectre [4] has proven, its cache
traces will stay. The adversary can access the traces by
launching a side-channel attack [6, 7].
Since side-channel attacks only reveal the accessed
address and not the loaded value, the load on line 3 is
not sufficient. In our example, only the second load (line
5) will leak the secret: The adversary will observe an
access to bar[secret] after which deriving the value of
secret is only a matter of subtraction.
In summary, the vulnerable pattern (see Figure 1b)
consists of an adversary-controlled load (line 3) followed
by a memory access (line 5) based on the loaded value. A
runtime check (line 2) must protect the load; otherwise,
the pattern turns into a traditional buffer overflow.
3 Preventing speculation
The most straightforward way of defending against
Bounds Check Bypass is to prevent the speculation it-
self. Consider the example in Figure 2a: illegal memory
access will never happen if the read (line 9) runs strictly
after the comparison (line 4).
There are two alternative approaches to enforcing this
property: completely preventing speculation via serializa-
tion instructions, and delaying loads by adding artificial
data dependencies.
3.1 Serialization
Intel documentation [2] proposes to patch vulnerable
regions of code by explicitly serializing them with an
LFENCE, an instruction that ensures that all prior instruc-
tions execute before it, and all later instructions—after1.
We can force the load to wait for the comparison by adding
an LFENCE in-between (see Figure 2b). To protect the ap-
plication entirely, we would have to add an LFENCE after
every comparison2 or, more precisely, after every condi-
tional branch.
The approach is, however, excessive because it delays
all the instructions after the comparison, not only the
vulnerable load. In Figure 2b, lines 8 and 12 do not
access memory and can safely run in parallel with the
comparison. And yet, the LFENCE delays them too.
3.2 Artificial data dependencies
A more efficient approach is to allow most of the instruc-
tions to benefit from speculation and delay only those that
read from memory (we assume that any data in memory
could be security sensitive).
1Before the publication of Spectre, the documentation described
LFENCE as an instruction that only prevent reordering of loads and not
other instructions. Afterward, Intel uncovered that LFENCE is, in fact, a
full serialization instruction [2, 3].
2Mind that we use comparison only as an example. In practice, any
operation that modifies EFLAGS could be used as a branch condition.
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Figure 3: Performance (runtime) overhead with respect to native version. (Lower is better.)
line
ar_
regr
ess
ion
strin
g_m
atch
ma
trix_
mul
tiply
hist
ogra
m
kme
ans pca
wo
rd_c
oun
t
me
an
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pr
oc
es
so
r I
PC
(in
str
uc
tio
ns
/cy
cle
)
Phoenix
Native (Clang) LFENCE-based defense SLH Dependency on arguments
Figure 4: IPC (instructions/cycle) numbers for native and protected versions. (Higher is better.)
Modern CPUs already have a mechanism for ensuring
that one instruction runs strictly after another without
delaying the rest of the instructions: data dependency.
The approach is to reuse this mechanism by adding an
artificial data dependency between conditional jumps and
later loads. In the previous example (Figure 2a), if we add
a data dependency between the comparison (line 4) and
the loads (lines 9 and 13), the load will be delayed while
the benign operations on lines 8 and 12 can still benefit
from parallelism.
4 Ways of introducing a data dependency
The idea behind the dependency-based approaches is to
delay all instructions using the secret until the compari-
son is resolved by masking the secret with a value data-
dependent on EFLAGS. There are two ways to get such
value: either by reading EFLAGS directly (LAHF instruc-
tion) or by using a conditional move. Alternatively, the
secret could be masked with comparison arguments, al-
though it provides much weaker ordering guarantees.
4.1 Dependency via LAHF
The simplest way to introduce the dependency is to use
LAHF, an instruction that stores the value of EFLAGS into
RAX (Figure 2c, line 5). We could reserve a register (e.g.,
R15) and modify it using the stored flags (e.g., via XOR)
to create a data dependency (line 6). Later, we twice XOR
the secret with R15 (lines 10–11) thus making all further
instructions using the secret dependent on the comparison,
but without actually changing the secret’s value.
The main issue of this approach is that we have to
temporary store (line 3) and restore (line 7) the value of
RAX every time we invoke LAHF. We cannot reserve RAX
as we did with R15 because many instructions rely on this
register. Correspondingly, it increases the runtime cost of
the protection.
4.2 Dependency via conditional move
To avoid the cost of keeping the RAX state, we could
use a conditional move, which is the approach used by
Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) [1].
SLH creates the dependency via CMOV, an instruction
that performs a move based on the value of one of the
status flags in the EFLAGS register. In Figure 2d, the secret
is masked (line 10) with a value that may be set to zero
(line 5) if the comparison and conditional move mismatch
(i.e., if we have a misprediction). It has a double effect.
First, similarly to LAHF-based defence, SLH makes the
loads data dependent on the comparison, which prevents
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Figure 5: Increase in number of instructions with respect to native version. (Lower is better.)
the speculation. Second, SLH zeroes out the loaded value
(lines 5 and 10) in case of misspeculation. Although it
is redundant on current hardware, future generations of
Intel CPUs may introduce a value prediction feature that
can speculate even in the presence of data dependency.
Since the mask could have only one of the two values—
either all ones or zero—there is no need to make a double
XOR and a single AND is sufficient (line 10).
4.3 Dependency on arguments
The approach used by SLH could be simplified even fur-
ther. Instead of creating a dependency on EFLAGS, we
could add a dependency on the comparison arguments
(see Figure 2e, line 3). Hence, the comparison can run
in parallel with the loads, while the dependency ensures
that the leaky load will start only when the arguments
are either in registers or in L1 cache. In this case, the
speculation window will likely last only 1–2 cycles.
Although this approach may prevent the leak in many
cases, it does not provide any strict guarantees of order-
ing. If the CPU reorders the instructions such that the
comparison begins after the loads (e.g., because of an
internal hardware hazard), the attack can still succeed. If
the attacker comes up with a way to delay the comparison
reliably, it will render this strategy ineffective.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance impact of the
approaches descussed in §3 and §4. We used the author’s
implementation of SLH and we implemented the other
two approaches on our own.
Experimental Setup. The experiments were carried out
on a machine with a 4-core Intel processor operating at
3.3 GHz (Haswell microarchitecture) with 32GB of RAM,
a 256GB SATA-based SDD, and running Linux kernel
4.15. Each core has private 32KB L1 and 256KB L2
caches, and all cores share an 8MB L3 cache. We used
the largest available datasets provided by the Phoenix
benchmark suite. As of compilers, we used LLVM 7.0
for SLH and LLVM 5.0 for the other two approaches.
The numbers are normalized against the native LLVM
of the corresponding version. For all measurements, we
report the average over ten runs and geometric mean for
the “gmean” across benchmarks.
Performance. Figure 3 shows performance overheads
of the LFENCE-based defense, SLH, and dependency on
arguments, measured across the Phoenix benchmarks [5].
As we see, adding LFENCEs after every conditional
branch is extremely expensive and causes 440% slow-
down on average. Such a high overhead appears because
LFENCE virtually disables speculative execution. As Fig-
ure 4 shows, the application cannot use the available
instruction-level parallelism to its full extent: With the
LFENCEs, the average number of instructions per cycle
(IPC) drops from ~2.3 to ~0.5. As of the dependency on
arguments and SLH, they delay only memory accesses
and therefore, IPC drops only to ~2.
IPC is not the only influencial factor, though. histogram
has lower overhead with SLH, yet the IPC is lower than
with the dependency on arguments. Here, the overhead is
mainly caused by additional instructions (see Figure 5).
SLH uses only a single AND for masking, whereas the
other approaches need two XORs. Histogram, having more
loads and fewer loops than other benchmarks, has this
effect more pronounced.
As of the extreme cases, pca contains large loops with
many arithmetic operations (mainly vectorized) on its hot
path, hence the speculation has less influence on it. On the
other side of the spectrum are kmeans and string_match.
Here, the high overheads are caused by tight loops on
the hot path. Both SLH and the dependency on argu-
ments force the loops to run sequentially thus reducing
the level of parallelism (see Figure 4). SLH versions are
slower because SLH uses a more expensive instruction to
instrument conditional branches (CMOV instead of XOR).
4
6 Conclusion
We presented an overview of possible approaches to pre-
venting Bounds Check Bypass by creating artificial data
dependencies between conditional jumps and subsequent
memory loads. Because of allowing benign instructions to
run in parallel with the jumps, these approaches achieve
much better utilization of the available CPU resources
in comparison to serialization with LFENCEs. In our ex-
periments, they introduce 60% overhead, while LFENCE-
based defense causes 440% slowdown.
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